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ATTORNEYS' CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN
THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY
Farrell C. Glasser*
Investment companies, more commonly known as mutual
funds,1 have had a history of incestuous relationships which have
thrived on conflicts of interest. It is currently common practice in
the investment company industry for mutual funds and their
affiliated management companies (advisers) and underwriters to
retain the same legal counsel.3 Because of the unique relationships
that exist in the investment company industry, 4 this practice has
in many instances had unfortunate consequences for the mutual
funds involved. When a mutual fund has a legal right against its
adviser or underwriter, or where an officer or director of the fund
or the fund's adviser breaches his fiduciary duty to the fund, it
seems anomalous to permit the same attorney to represent both
the fund and its affiliates in such traditionally adversary circum-
stances. Representation of these conflicting interests by the same
attorney may hinder the effective determination, assertion, and
* Staff Attorney, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion. Member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars. B.A., 1966, The American
University; J.D., 1969, Syracuse University; M.B.A., 197 1, Syracuse University. The
views expressed in this article are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Published with the permission of the George
Washington University.
'A mutual fund is a specific classification of investment company, known as an
open-ended company, which is prepared to redeem issued shares at their net asset value.
Although there are three basic types of investment companies, by far the most prevalent is
the mutual fund. Definitions of the various types of investment companies are found in the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3 to -5 (1970) (Act).
2 Abraham Pomerantz, a noted attorney, has stated with respect to conflicts of interest in
the investment company industry:
[O]f all dualities and of all conflicts on [the American corporate] scene,
nothing-but nothing-approaches the open end mutual fund for in-
cestuous relationships.
The fund is conceived by people whom we call advisers or man-
agers .... This group gives birth to the fund. The fund is manned by the
advisers .... [T]he umbilical cord is never cut after birth, as would be true in
ordinary biological life.
University of Pennsylvania Law School Conference on Mutual Funds, The Mutual Fund
Management Fee, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 726, 739 (1967). See generally Note, The Mutual
Fund and Its Management Company: An Analysis of Business Incest, 71 YALE L.J. 137
(1961); Comment, Mutual Funds and Independent Directors: Can Moses Lead to Better
Business Judgment?, 1972 DUKE L.J. 429 (1972).
3 See note 16 and accompanying text infra.
4 See text accompanying notes 6- 16infra.
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effectuation of the legal rights of the fund in an adversary con-
text.5
This article explores the problem of conflicts of interest result-
ing from the retention of the same attorneys by investment com-
panies and their affiliates. After an analysis of the problem, it
suggests appropriate remedial measures that could be instituted to
prevent these conflicts from occurring in the investment company
industry.
I. THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY
AND FEDERAL REGULATION
A. Inherent Conflicts of Interest in
the Investment Company Context
It must be emphasized that there are significant differences
between an operating company (such as an industrial corporation)
and an investment company. The goals of the management and
the shareholders of an operating company are usually the same:
maximization of profits by minimization of the costs of produc-
tion.6 In the case of an investment company, however, the goals
of the fund and its shareholders on the one hand, and the goals of
the affiliated adviser on the other hand, are not necessarily the
same. The shareholders look to capital appreciation or current
income or a combination of the two, while the adviser seeks to
increase the advisory fee paid by the fund for managing its in-
vestment portfolio. The adviser's fee is not a function of the per
share growth of an individual's investment in the fund. Rather it is
a function of the size of the net assets of the fund. 7 As a result,
5See Comment, Duties of the Independent Director in Open-End Mutual Funds, 70
MICH. L. REV. 696, 721 (1972).
6 Mundheim, Some Thoughts on the Duties and Responsibilities of Unaffiliated Direc-
tors of Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1058, 1059 (1967).7 Most funds pay an advisory fee amounting to .05 percent or more of the average net
assets of the fund. The fee is based primarily on market quotations of the fund's portfolio
securities. It is computed on the basis of the average daily net assets of the fund at the
close of business on each business day and is paid monthly, quarterly, or over some other
period. In addition to payment of advisory fees, there has recently been a trend in the
industry toward the use of performance fees. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 205, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1970), states that performance fees must be
based on the asset value of the company or fund under management averaged
over a specified period and increasing and decreasing proportionately with
the investment performance cf the company or fund over a specified period
in relation to the investment record of an appropriate index of securities
prices .... [Tjhe point from which increases and decreases in compensation
are measured shall be the fee which is paid or earned when the investment
performance of such company or fund is equivalent to that of the index ....
Fund advisers have been able to structure these performance fees so that the adviser is
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one way the adviser can maintain or increase his fee is to encour-
age the underwriter, who is usually an affiliate of the adviser, to
increase the sale of fund shares, which will in turn increase the
amount of fund net assets. The advisory fee can in this way be
maintained or increased even in times of declining stock prices or
when poor investment decisions by the adviser result in a decline
in the value of the fund's investment portfolio.
An investment company is to be distinguished further from an
operating company in that the typical fund conducts its business
by means of an advisory agreement that outlines the relationship
between the fund and its adviser. Usually these agreements stipu-
late that as consideration for payment by the fund of an advisory
fee the adviser will furnish the fund with "investment advice and
assistance, office space and facilities .... pay all compensation
for personnel of the [f]und or [a]dviser performing services relat-
ing to research, statistical and investment activities and pay the
salaries and fees of all officers and directors of the [flund." 8 In
many instances the officers and directors of the adviser also serve
as officers and directors of the fund, except where proscribed by
statute. 9 In some instances the adviser is affiliated not only with
the fund's underwriter, but also with the registered broker-dealer
who executes the transactions for the funds portfolio.
The conflicts of interest which are indigenous to the fund's
relationship with its affiliates are unparalleled when compared
with those conflicts which arise out of the typical operating com-
pany's relationships. For example, because the members of the
compensated if the performance of a particular fund decreases over a period, as long as the
decrease is less than the decrease in the index against which the fund's performance is
measured. It should be emphasized that any performance fee paid by the fund results from
those cases where the fund outperforms the index. In cases where the fund fails to
outperform the index the advisory fee is decreased. Therefore, where a performance fee is
employed, the normal advisory fee paid by the fund becomes a fulcrum fee which can be
either increased or decreased depending on the fund's performance. See Note, The Mutual
Fund Industry:A Legal Survey, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 732, 886-93 (1969).
8 Prospectus of Salem Fund, Inc. at 3 (March 31, 1972). In many cases, the directors
and officers of the fund are paid nominal salaries by the fund itself. Since the directors and
officers who are affiliates of the adviser are usually paid a substantial salary by the adviser
for their services as employees of the adviser, situations involving conflicts of interest can
develop readily. To exacerbate the conflict of interest problem, in some instances the
adviser pays the salaries of the unaffiliated disinterested directors. It has recently been
disclosed in the proxies and prospectuses of the Fidelity Group of Funds, a complex of
fifteen funds, that the adviser, Fidelity Management and Research Company, pays each
unaffiliated director approximately $25,800 a year for managing all of the funds in the
complex. Each director serves on the board of directors for all of the funds in the complex.
The payment of such sizeable fees to the unaffiliated disinterested directors can only serve
to diminish the objectivity of these directors in representing the interests of the share-
holders of the funds. See note 36 and accompanying text infra for a definition and
description of disinterested directors.
9 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1970).
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fund's board of directors and its adviser are generally the same,
the consent of the fund's board to the investment decisions of the
adviser often may be perfunctory. 10 In addition, genuine arm's
length bargaining over matters such as the advisory fee or the
terms of the advisory agreement is difficult because the fund is
represented either by those with an interest directly contrary to
that of the fund or by persons under the influence of those with a
contrary interest." Competitive forces do not exist in the in-
vestment company industry with respect to the advisory fee.
Rather, there is a seller's market in which an adviser "wearing
one hat, sets his own fee without fear that the fund's board, on
which he wears his other hat, can or will bargain effectively with
him, much less actually shop around for competitive offers."' 2
Among the conflicts of interest involving the fund' 3 that can
develop are: first, the fund may place its brokerage business with
a broker-dealer who performs services for or is affiliated with the
fund's adviser; second, the broker-dealer employed by the fund
may have a financial interest in the volume of portfolio transac-
tions which he executes for the fund;' 4 third, the fund's under-
writer may be too concerned with considerations relating to sales
and salability of the fund's shares; and fourth, a director or officer
of the fund may make purchases or sales of securities that are also
held by the fund.' 5
It is clear that in many instances the interests of the fund and
its adviser are divergent. Yet it is often the case that the fund is
represented or serviced by counsel retained by the adviser.' 6
"0 See generally Jaretzki, Duties and Responsibilities of Directors of Mutual Funds, 29
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 777 (1964).
1 The conflict between the adviser-director's duty to the fund shareholders to
keep the advisory and other fees as low as possible and his own self-interest
in maximizing them [exists in many situations]. [I]n the case of... a pub-
licly-held adviser a duty to maximize [the adviser's] profits-at the expense
of the fund-runs from those in control of the adviser to its own share-
holders. Thus, the adviser's representative on the fund's board must con-
stantly face pressures from the public shareholders of the investment adviser
which conflict with his duties to the public shareholders of the fund.
Hearings on S. 1659 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., I st
Sess., pt. I, at 130-31 (1967) (statement of Mr. Cohen).
12 Id. at 13 1.
3 See Comment, supra note 2, at 432-33.
14 The larger the volume of transactions the greater the amount of commissions received
by the broker. This creates a tendency for the broker to "churn" the account in an attempt
to create more commissions.
5 Jaretzki, supra note 10, at 789.
16 SEC, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP.
No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 74, 130 (1966) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC POLICY
IMPLICATIONS]; WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL
FUNDS, H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1962); Mundheim, supra note 6, at
1072.
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Where the same attorney represents both the fund and its
affiliates, the attorney is placed in a position in which he may be
required to represent and advocate interests which are truly ad-
verse. It is axiomatic in a situation where gain for one client is
loss for another that counsel cannot maximize the interests of
both clients.
B. The Investment Company Act of 194017
It is apparent that in situations such as those discussed above,
the interests of investment company shareholders can be under-
mined. The shareholders, taken as a group, own the investment
company itself and will prosper or fail in relation to its investment
performance. In contrast the organizers and promoters of the fund
own the management and sales organizations, and their prosperity
will be a function of the ability of these persons to generate sales
and commissions and to build the size of the fund.' 8 It was in
response to these differing interests that Congress enacted the
Investment Company Act of 1940 (Act).19
In one provision designed to combat the disregard by the man-
agement for the interests of the fund shareholders, Congress de-
fined the term "affiliated person."'2 0 By limiting the roles such
affiliated persons could play in the fund, Congress attempted to
make investment companies more responsive to their share-
holders.2 ' The Act thus indicates precisely what degree of rela-
tionship among the fund, management, and the investment adviser
will engender conflicts of interest. Under Section 10 of the Act, at
17U.S.C. §§80a-1 to -52 (1970). For a discussion of the Act, see Jaretzki, The
Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 WASH. U.L.Q. 303 (1941); Bosland, The In-
vestment Company Act of 1940 and Its Background, 49 J. POL. EcON. 477 (1941);
Motley et. al., Federal Regulation of Investment Companies Since 1940, 63 HARV. L.
REV. 1134 (1950); Thomas, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 9 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 918 (1941); Tolins, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 77
(1940).
18 This results from the fact that fund management fees are calculated as a percentage of
assets. N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1971, § 3 at 3, col. 3.
19 See Note, supra note 7, at 787-96.
20 15 U.S.C. § 80a- 2(a)(3) (1970) defines "affiliated person of another person" to be:
(A) any person directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or holding with
power to vote, 5 per centum or more of the outstanding voting securities of
such other person; (B) any person 5 per centum or more of whose out-
standing voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held
with power to vote, by such other person; (C) any person directly or in-
directly controlling, controlled by, or under'common control with, such other
person; (D) any officer, director, partner, copartner, or employee of such
other person; (E) if such other person is an investment company, any in-
vestment adviser thereof or any member of an advisory board thereof; and
(F) if such other person is an unincorporated investment company not having
a board of directors, the depositor thereof.
21 PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 16, at 130-31. Abraham Pomerantz, com-
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least 40 percent of the directors of a registered investment com-
pany are prohibited from being investment advisers or persons
affiliated with the adviser. 22 In addition, a majority of fund direc-
tors is forbidden from acting as the principal underwriter, bro-
ker, or investment banker for the fund.23 Nor is an investment
company allowed to have a majority of its board of directors
composed of persons who are officers or directors of any one
bank. 24 The theory of the provisions regarding affiliated persons is
two-fold: first, all fund transactions should be scrutinized by at
least a minority of directors who are independent from the man-
agement; and second, where director affiliations could involve
conflicts of interest, a majority of independent directors assures
the shareholders of some degree of protection. 25 The legislative
intent behind the creation of these independent directors was to
impose a buffer between the investment adviser and the share-
holders of the fund. 6 It was believed that these directors would
be responsive to the needs of the fund and would objectively
review the operation of the fund in order to diminish conflicts of
interest. Although all the directors of the fund have a fiduciary
duty to the fund's shareholders, 27 it was felt that the independent
directors would be in the best position to insure that this duty was
effectively carried out. Even with this provision for unaffiliated
directors, however, the shareholders of investment companies
have not been objectively represented.
28
Section 17 was specifically incorporated into the Act 29 as a
legislative attempt to resolve the problem of conflicts of interest in
the investment company industry. The provisions of that section
interpose the Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission
or SEC) between the fund and any affiliated person who desires to
consummate a purchase or sale of property with the fund; upon
application the SEC may exempt certain transactions from the
prohibition.30 Subsection 17(d) prohibits certain transactions in
menting on the role of the unaffiliated director, however, has stated that the effectiveness
of the unaffiliated director as a prc.tector of the shareholders' interest is vitiated when he is
chosen, as frequently occurs, by the affiliated directors. University of Pennsylvania Law
School Conference on Mutual Funds, supra note 2, at 739.
22 15 U.S.C. § 80a- 10(a) (1970).
23 Id. § 80a- 10(b).
24 Id. § 80a- 10(c).
Jaretzki, supra note 17, at 319- 20.
26 S. REP. No. 91- 184, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 32-34 (1969).
27 For a discussion of the fiduciary obligations of directors, see part IV infra.
28See text accompanying notes 131-47 infra. See generally Comment, supra note 2;
Comment, supra note 5, at 701. See also PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 16, at
130-31.
2 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1970).
30 d. §§ 80a- 17(a), (b).
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which an affiliated person and the fund propose to act jointly.31
The Commission is given statutory authority to review these joint
transactions and determine the extent to which participation by
the fund is on a basis different from or less advantageous than that
of any other participant. 32 When fund advisers utilize reciprocal
arrangements in connection with brokerage generated by portfolio
transactions, Subsection 17(e) provides that affiliates acting as
agents33 may not receive any compensation in such transactions
other than regular salary from the fund, except in the course of
their business as a broker or underwriter.
34
C. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970
In 1970 Congress amended the 1940 Act by enacting the
Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 (Amended
Act).35 One important change from the 1940 Act was to broaden
the requirement that 40 percent of the directors be unaffiliated
to the requirement that these directors also be disinter-
ested. 36 The term "interested director" includes members of
the immediate family of any natural person who is affiliated with
the fund; interested persons 37 of any investment adviser or princi-
3 1 id. § 80a- 17(c).
32 See In the Matter of Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., Investment Company Act
Release No. 6634 (July 22, 1970). The granting of an order in this case by the Commission
represents the first time that the Commission has permitted a blanket exemption for a
pattern of transactions under Subsection 17(d). However, if any variation occurs from the
strict conditions of the order granting the application, a new application must be filed and
acted upon by the Commission. Thus, when there is a possibility that any conflict of
interest may arise, the Commission has reserved its statutory authority to review the
transaction to assure fair treatment for the fund and its shareholders.
33 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e) (1970). Brokers who effectuate these transactions on behalf ofa
fund are acting as agents for the fund.
34 See In the Matter of Provident Management Corp., Securities Act Release No. 5 115
(December 1, 1970). See also In the Matter of First Multifund of America Inc., In-
vestment Company Act Release No. 6700 (August 26, 1971).
35 Act of December 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1414, amending 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80a-1 et seq. (1970).
36 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1970). See Comment, supra note 5, at 703-20. The duties of
the disinterested directors are to:
(1) evaluate investment advice provided by the adviser;
(2) determine quality of service provided in relation to performance;
(3) inform themselves as to the functions of the investment adviser:
(4) determine what changes could be made that would benefit fund shareholders;
(5) study the advisory fee to see if it is reasonable;
(6) compare expense ratio of fund with other funds whose size and objectives are
similar, but whose advisory function is internally generated; and
(7) determine the costs the adviser incurs in providing services to fund to see if his fee
is too high.
These, of course, are by no means all the duties of the disinterested director, but are a
sample of the type of service he should be providing the fund. See generally Mundheim &
Nutt, The Independent Directors of Mutual Funds, WHARTON Q., Spring, 1972, at 6.
37 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A) (1970). See Comment, supra note 5, at 702.
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pal underwriter of a fund; and legal counsel for the fund, the
investment adviser, or the principal underwriter of the fund during
the past two fiscal years; it further includes partners or employees
of counsel and other persons. In addition, Congress has given the
SEC power to issue orders declaring a party interested under
certain circumstances. 38 The SEC is also given the power to
exempt a party from the Act's restrictions on board membership
upon an appropriate showing that the person is in a position to act
independently on behalf of the investment company and its share-
holders in dealing with the adviser or principal underwriter.39
Congress expressly intended that the SEC should adopt a broad
interpretation of the term "interested person." 40
Another significant amendment to the 1940 Act concerns the
power of the SEC to bring injunctive actions against the fund's
affiliates pursuant to Subsection 36(a).41 Prior to the amendment
of Subsection 36(a), these actions were permitted only in cases
involving "gross abuse of trust" or "gross misconduct" on the
part of the fund's affiliates. Because this standard was too
inflexible for courts to administer, 42 shareholders of investment
companies could not be assured that the Act offered adequate
protection against unscrupulous affiliates. Under the 1970 amend-
ment of Subsection 36(a), the Commission can now bring an
injunctive action against the affiliates of an investment company if
they have engaged or are about to engage in any act or practice
38 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (1970).
3 9 1d. § 80a-6(c).40 S. REP. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 34 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 91-1382, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
41 15 U.S.C. §80a-35(a) (1970) states:
The Commission is authorized to bring an action in the proper district court
of the United States .... alleging that a person serving or acting in one or
more of the following capacities has engaged within five years of the com-
mencement of the action or is about to engage in any act or practice con-
stituting a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct in respect
of any registered investment company for which such person so serves or
acts -
(I) as officer, director, member of any advisory board, investment ad-
viser, or depositor; or
(2) as principal underwriter, if such registered company is an open-end
company, unit investment trust, or face-amount certificate company.
If such allegations are established, the court may enjoin such persons from
acting in any or all such capacities either permanently or temporarily and
award such injunctive or other relief against such person as may be reason-
able and appropriate in the circumstances, having due regard to the protec-
tion of investors and to the effectuation of policies declared in section
80a- I(b) of this title.
But see In the Matter of Middendorf, Colgate & Co., Adm. Pro. No. 3-3836 (July 25,
1972).
42 See S. REP. No. 91-184, 91 st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1969).
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constituting a breach of fiduciary duty involving any type of
personal misconduct with respect to any fund. 43
II. INDEPENDENT COUNSEL AND THE CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. The Code of Professional Responsibility44
In order to understand the role that the attorney should play in
representing the fund and its adviser or underwriter, it is helpful
to look at the guidelines which the American Bar Association has
adopted with regard to conflicts of interest resulting from dual
representation by attorneys. The newly adopted Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility (Code) is comprised of Canons,'4 5 Ethical
Considerations,46 and Disciplinary Rules. 47 The Code provides
the basic precepts of ethical conduct to be applied by the attor-
ney. An examination of selected provisions will assist in analyzing
the problems associated with practice in the investment company
context.
Canon 5 contains several Ethical Considerations that the attor-
ney should strive to follow in his representation of clients. 4
Ethical Consideration 5-14 states:
Maintaining the independence of professional judgment re-
quired of a lawyer precludes his acceptance or continuation
of employment that will adversely affect his judgment on
behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a client. This problem arises
whenever a lawyer is asked to represent two or more clients
who may have differing interests, whether such interests be
conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or otherwise discordant.49
43 See text accompanying notes 124- 29 infra.
44 Adopted August 12, 1969. The Code completely revises the ABA Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics, first adopted in 1908.
45 Canons are stated to be:
statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the standards of
professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the
public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession. They embody the
general concepts from which the [Ethical Considerations are dck'ived.]
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, PRELIMINARY STATEMENT [hereinafter
cited as CODE].
46 Ethical Considerations are "aspirational in character and represent the objectives
toward which every member of the profession should strive. They constitute a body of
principles upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific situations."Id.
47 "The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in charac-
ter. [They] state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without
being subject to disciplinary action."Id.
48 
CODE, Canon No. 5.
49 CODE, Ethical Consideration No. 5-14 (emphasis added). Ethical Consideration 5-15
provides:
[VOL. 6:58
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The former Canons of Professional Ethics 50 defined conflicting
interests as those which occur "when, in behalf of one client, it is
his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires
him to oppose. ' ' 51 The new concept of "differing interests" ap-
pears to be broader and more inclusive than the old concept of
conflicting interests.
The Code implies that an attorney can continue to represent
differing interests so long as there is full disclosure to all clients
and their consent to such representation is obtained. 52 In the
investment company industry, however, dual representation
should not be permissible. The attorney for the fund is usually
retained by the management company, which pays his salary and
to which he is ultimately responsible.53 Counsel's loyalty, whether
consciously or unconsciously, is directed primarily toward the
management company and not toward the fund. Professor Mund-
heim has commented regarding former Canon 6 that "the Canons'
simple prescriptions for dealing with conflicts of interest often
seem to ignore the practical demands of corporate life. Frequently
it would be silly to follow their directions literally." 54 Professor
Mundheim also noted that under circumstances such as those
encountered in the corporate situation, courts have said the dis-
closure of conflicts and some measure of consent by the client is
If a lawyer is requested to undertake or to continue representation of mul-
tiple clients having potentially differing interests, he must weigh carefully the
possibility that his judgment may be impaired or his loyalty divided if he
accepts or continues the employment. He should resolve all doubts against
the propriety of the representation .... (emphasis added).
Ethical Consideration 5-16 states:
[Where] a lawyer is justified in representing two or more clients having
differing interests, it is nevertheless essential that each client be given the
opportunity to evaluate his need for representation free of any potential
conflict and to obtain other counsel if he so desires. Thus before a lawyer
may represent multiple clients, he should explain fully to each client the
implications of the common representation and should accept or continue
employment only if the clients consent ....
Ethical Consideration 5-18 states:
A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his
allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee,
representative, or other person connected with the entity. In advising the
entity, a lawyer should keep paramount its interests and his professional
judgment should not be influenced by the personal desires of any person or
organization ....
See also Canon 9 of the CODE.50 See note 44 supra.
51 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 6.
52 See Ethical Consideration 5-16, supra note 49.
53 See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
54 Mundheim, Representing the Acquired Company in Merger Negotiations: Some
Problems of Professional Responsibility, 10 CORP. PRACTICE COMMENTATOR 217, 229
(1968).
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not sufficient to permit counsel to represent adverse interests. 55
Judge McGowan feels that disclosure of conflicts to the client
simply shifts the burden of avoiding or approving the conflict to
the client.5 6 He suggests that this is unrealistic, because "it is
[not] the client who can best make the decision as to whether
there is a harmful conflict, even though he knows all the facts." 57
There would seem to be only two viable solutions to this
problem of conflicts of interest. First, the lawyer should determine
when a conflict exists and should advise the client that separate
counsel should be retained; or second, in the case of investment
companies especially, independent counsel should be retained
when the relationship between the fund and the management
company first comes into existence. Judge McGowan has also
noted that representation of multiple clients raises a problem with
respect to possible future conflicts arising out of a present transac-
tion which involves no conflict.
58
It is not uncommon in the investment company industry for one
attorney or firm of attorneys to represent both the fund and its
adviser or other affiliates. 9 In addition, the board of directors of
the fund and its officers are usually, except as regulated by stat-
ute, comprised of officers and directors of the adviser or under-
writer.60 In many instances the unaffiliated directors of the fund
are paid for their services by the adviser.6 1 Situations often devel-
op where the director-officers who are paid by the adviser have
interests which are contrary to those of the fund, as for example
where a derivative suit has been instituted against the direc-
tor-officer. The attorney representing the fund in this action may
also be paid by the adviser. In this situation for whom is the
attorney an advocate? 62 It is not humanly possible in such situ-
ations for counsel to represent both interests fairly and equitably,
even where full disclosure is made to both sets of clients. In-
vestment companies for the most part are publicly held corpo-
rations with an obligation to their shareholders. In addition, dual
representation, even with disclosure, would appear to be violative
of Canon 9, under which even the appearance of impropriety may
be sufficient to warrant retention of independent counsel. 63
55 See Mundheim,supra note 54, at 226 n. 16; W.E. Basset Co. v. H.C. Cook Co., 201
F. Supp. 821 (D. Conn. 1962).
56 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL, CONFERENCE ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST
13, 15 (Conference Series No. 17, 1961).57 Id.
58 Id. at 16.
59 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
60 PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 16, at 74.
61 See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
6
2 See Ethical Consideration 5-18, supra note 49.
63 Canon 9 of the Code treats the matter of public confidence in a lawyer.
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Considerations of expeditious handling and expense and the
dubious belief that one can represent both sides of a transaction
fairly are often used as convincing arguments for dual representa-
tion.64 It is unrealistic to expect that counsel hired by the manage-
ment company could act with complete independence on behalf of
the fund in a transaction with the management company, e.g., the
drawing up of the advisory agreement or determining the manage-
ment fee. The retention of independent counsel at the inception of
the fund's relationship with its adviser or underwriter would en-
sure that the judgment and advice of counsel on behalf of the fund
would be truly independent of the influence of the adviser.
B. Applicable Case Law
In recent cases concerning the issue of dual representation by
counsel, the courts have consistently held that an attorney may
not represent different interests which are hostile or in conflict
with one another. In borderline cases of conflicts of interest
doubts should generally be resolved in favor of disqualification. 65
In most cases the issues are not sharply defined, and a facile
determination of what constitutes conflicts of interest is not pos-
sible. Corporate and labor union litigation has provided an active
arena for disputes involving the issue of conflicts of interest
arising out of dual representation by counsel of both individual
defendants and the corporation or labor union. In these cases the
courts have uniformly held that independent counsel is required.66
64 Professor Kaplan has noted with respect to dual representation by counsel that:
[T]he lawyer is certainly in no position to battle vigorously on behalf of any
party to the transaction as an advocate unless he is previously committed to
one party primarily, in which case he is certainly unlikely to battle vigorously
against his primary client (the management company). The lawyer in such a
situation either unfairly acts against the interests of one of his clients or is
emasculated as an advocate and cannot [sic] act only as a neutral resource
person.
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATIONS,
CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN CORPORATE LAW PRACTICE 207 (1971) (remarks of Professor
Kaplan) [hereinafter cited as Kaplan].
6See Brasseaux v. Girouard, 214 So. 2d 401 (La. 1969).
6The noted case, Milone v. English, 306 F.2d 814 (D.C. Cir. 1962), involved the
Labor-Management Reporting Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 501 (b) (1970), which
enables a member of a union to bring an action in behalf of his union against any officers of
that union who have been derelict in their duty. The Act gives the members of unions
powers which resemble a shareholder's right to maintain a derivative action against
corporate management. The court here held that
[clounsel who are chosen by and represent officers charged with...
misconduct, and who also represent the union, are not able to guide the
litigation in the best interests of the union because of the conflict in counsel's
loyalties. In such a situation it would be incumbent upon counsel not to
represent both the union and the officers.
306 F.2d at 817. See also Lewis v. Shaffer Stores Co., 218 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
Elberta Oil Co. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 344, 291 P. 668 (1930); Garlen v. Green
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Lewis v. Shaffer Stores Co.6 7 involved an action brought by a
shareholder of a corporation against the officers, directors, and a
majority shareholder of that corporation. Plaintiff asked for recov-
ery of short-swing profits resulting from the individual defendants'
purchase and sale of securities of the corporation and also for
recovery of losses allegedly incurred by the company as a result
of certain transactions initiated under the defendants' control. A
single law firm retained by the corporation represented the com-
pany and the individual defendants in the action. Defendants filed
a joint answer denying all charges of wrongdoing. Plaintiff moved
that the law firm should not be permitted to continue its represen-
tation of all defendants and requested that the corporation be
represented by "genuinely independent counsel." 68 The court
granted plaintiff's motion and stated that the corporation should
"retain independent counsel, who have no previous connection
with the corporation, to advise it as to the position which it should
take in this controversy." 69 Counsel representing the individual
defendants could not represent the corporation because it was
evident that the interests of the officers, directors, and the major-
ity shareholder were "clearly adverse . . . to the interests of the
stockholders of [the corporation] other than defendants." 70 This
rationale is equally applicable to derivative actions brought by
shareholders of investment companies.
In Murphy v. Washington American League Baseball Club
7
an action was brought by a minority shareholder for the purpose
of invalidating salary increases for board members voted by the
company's board of directors. The corporation and a director
were made defendants. The corporation and the director were
represented by the same counsel, who filed a joint answer in their
behalf, defending the action on the merits. The court noted that
the corporation had authorized the payment of all legal fees aris-
ing out of the action. The court then ruled that counsel's dual
Mansions, Inc., 9 App. Div. 2d 760, 193 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1959): Essential Enterprises
Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 343, 182 A.2d 647 (1962); Hayman v. Morris, 37
N.Y.S.2d 884 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
67218 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
68 Id. at 239.
69 Id. at 240.
70 Id. at 239-40. One commentator believes that:
Since such adversity of interest is typically manifested in shareholders'
complaints, and since most courts will be equally reluctant to reach the
merits at an early stage, adoption of the Lewis court's ethical viewpoint
would bar dual representation in most derivative actions.
Note, Independent Representation for Corporate Defendants in Derivative Suits, 74 YALE
L.J. 524, 525- 26 (1965).
71 324 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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representation raised a serious question.7 2 Referring to its deci-
sion in Milone v. English,73 the court emphasized that the evils
associated with dual representation must be prevented whether
the dual representation is a result of union litigation or a share-
holder derivative suit. The court held that the corporation and the
individual defendants should retain separate counsel.
74
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hoffa75 an action
was brought by members of a labor organization against union
officials who were charged with a breach of fiduciary duty. In this
action the same attorney represented both the union and the
officials who were charged with misconduct. The court ruled that
the union was entitled to "representation of its institutional in-
terests by independent counsel, unencumbered by potentially
conflicting obligations .. .".76 The court was not persuaded by
defendants' contention that the similarity of the defenses offered
by the organization and the individual defendants eliminated pos-
sible conflicts of interest. The court further stated, "Potential, no
less than actual, conflict disqualifies counsel from serving in a
double capacity . . . . "77 The court went on to say that if the
interests of the two parties became seriously adverse, and the
responsibilities of counsel conflicting, this duality would be un-
tenable regardless of how objective counsel attempted to be.
78
Recently, in Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of America,
79
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that the regular law firm employed by the union must be
disqualified from representing it in a lawsuit brought by the late
Joseph A. Yablonski and other dissident members of the union
against the union and three of its officers for misappropriation of
certain funds.
The court did not consider it necessary to determine whether
an actual conflict of interest existed. It thought that the public
interest required that the validity of the allegations of breach of
fiduciary duty against the union management should be deter-
mined in a context free from even the appearance of any potential
conflict of interest in the representation of the union. 80 The court
72 Id. at 397.
73 306 F.2d 814 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See note 66 supra.
74324 F.2d at 398.
75 242 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1965).
761d. at 256.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 257.
- 448 F.2d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1971), petition for mandamus granted, 454 F.2d 1036
(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972).
80448 F.2d at 1180.
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noted that the lawsuit was actually a derivative action, brought for
the benefit of the union, and that the case must be viewed in the
light of several pending cases alleging similar types of misconduct
on the part of union officers, in which counsel was defending the
individual officers."' The court then held that under the circum-
stances the best interests of the union would be served by the
disqualification of regular union counsel.
8 2
There is a close correlation between the relationships of the
union management toward its members and of the directors of a
mutual fund toward its shareholders. Both have fiduciary duties
which are owed to the members or shareholders. Furthermore,
both union members and mutual fund shareholders have a direct
financial interest in the outcome of litigation brought by individual
members or shareholders on behalf of the organization. In both
situations, although the organization is a nominal defendant, it will
benefit, as will the individuals who are members of the group.
Both actions are in the nature of a derivative suit brought by a
shareholder on behalf of the corporation. Thus, the situation in
which counsel represents both the union and the individual
officers of the union in a single action seems closely analogous to
a situation in which counsel for an investment company repre-
sents both the fund and its adviser in the same proceeding
8 3
Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc.8 4 arose as a result of the
decision of the Zambian government to nationalize its domestic
copper reserves and refining operations. Roan Selection Trust,
Ltd., of which 42 percent was owned by American Metal Climax,
entered into an agreement with Metal Climax for amalgamation of
the two companies in order to prevent all of its property from
being taken over. Suit was brought by a shareholder to enjoin the
amalgamation of the two corporations on the ground that the
disclosure provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 19348
5
had been violated. The law firm which had represented both
8 1 Id. at 1182.
82 Id.
83 TheYablonski court specifically said:
We think the analogy of the position of a corporation and its individual
officers when confronted by a stockholder derivative suit is illuminating
here .... Certainly no corporate counsel purports to represent the individual
officers involved, neither in the particular derivative suit nor in other litiga-
tion by virtue of which counsel necessarily must create ties of loyalty and
confidentiality to the individual officers, which might preclude counsel from
the most effective representation of the corporation itself. The corporation
has certain definite institutional interests to be protected, and the counsel
charged with this responsibility should have ties on a personal basis with
neither the dissident stockholders nor the incumbent officeholders.
Id. at 1181.
84 322 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 197 1), rev'd in part, 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1972).
8 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aetseq.(1970).
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Metal Climax and Roan for over thirty-five years continued to
represent both companies after the amalgamation was proposed.
Plaintiff alleged that this dual representation was not disclosed to
shareholders. While this conflict had been approved by Roan's
board of directors, the district court thought the approval mean-
ingless because of the control Metal Climax had over Roan and
its board of directors.8
Although the district court in the Metal Climax case held that
disclosure of conflicts of interest is a prerequisite in merger cases,
disclosure alone would not be effective to prevent conflicts in the
case of investment companies because of the unique variety of
conflicts which exist in the industry.8 7 The very nature of the
relationship between the adviser and the fund assures that there
are significant possibilities of antagonistic interests. An attorney
who represents both the adviser and the fund can hardly be
expected to be objective in his judgment and employment of
skills. Disclosure and consent are effective tools only when the
multiple interests represented are not significantly divergent 8
On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that
the proxy material used by Roan to obtain shareholder approval
of its amalgamation with Metal Climax violated Rule lOb-5 89 and
that relief of some kind should be afforded Roan's minority share-
86 The court stated:
[Counsel] thus placed itself in a clear position of conflict of interest. Though
this position is sought to be justified because the RST directors agreed to
allow [counsel] to continue to represent it notwithstanding the conflict, such
agreement is meaningless in view of AMAX's control of RST and the RST
Board. Nevertheless, even assuming that [counsel] could continue to repre-
sent both, their position is a material fact which should have been disclosed
to the shareholders. It would be important for shareholders, in evaluating the
advice of RST directors to vote in favor of the amalgamation, to know
that ... RST was being advised by lawyers who were also advising AMAX.
322 F. Supp. at 1362.
Professor Kaplan has commented on this decision as follows:
There seems no doubt that counsel in this situation was representing both
sides in an adversary transaction and that the general principles of the Code
of Professional Responsibility would forbid such representation in the ab-
sence of appropriate disclosure and assent. The court quite sensibly took the
position that consent granted by the board of directors of the subsidiary was
ineffectual and that presumably such consent could only have been given by
the subsidiary's minority shareholders after appropriate disclosure to
them .... [lhe court's remarks, though dicta, may be tantamount to saying
that counsel should not have acted on behalf of both sides of the amalgama-
tion proceedings .... The principle deducible from the court's disapproving
remarks concerning dual representation in the AMAX case, where the
conflict was openly apparent, would also seem to apply to many other types
of transactions in which a corporation and its management are frequently
represented by corporate counsel.
Kaplan, supra note 64, at 207.
8 7 See text accompanying notes 2-16 supra.
88 See Kaplan, supra note 64, at 207.
s9 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1972).
Journal of Law Reform
holders? The court reversed the lower court with regard to the
finding that counsel had placed itself in a situation involving a
conflict of interest by representing both parties to the amalgama-
tion. Instead, the court held that the record did not support the
lower court's finding that activities of counsel created a conflict of
interest which the defendants were obligated to disclose. 91 The
basis for the court's rejection of the lower court's holding was that
the district court had misconstrued "the factual premise that the
firm was in a conflict of interest position with respect to the
negotiation of the terms of the amalgamation. ' 92 In fact, the court
noted, the conflict only arose when Metal Climax and Roan
commenced negotiations for the amalgamation. The court empha-
sized that when negotiations began counsel immediately advised
Roan that it could not represent it in negotiations and Roan
retained new counsel for the purposes of the amalgamation bar-
gaining. 93 It is significant to note that the court's holding does not
vitiate the need for independent counsel when conflict arises from
dual representation but rests solely on the factual issue that during
the period when counsel was representing Roan there was no
conflict arising out of such representation. It can be assumed that
if counsel had continued to represent Roan without disclosure
during the period when the conflict would have existed, conduct
of counsel would have been censurable? 4
11I. ANALOGIES TO OTHER AREAS OF SECURITIES WORK
In analyzing the problem of the same counsel's representing
both the investment company and its affiliates, it is productive to
study other areas of securities work where analogous problems
have arisen. Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.95 is illustra-
tive of such problems. BarChris sold debentures to the public
pursuant to a registration statement. The company subsequently
went into bankruptcy. Debenture holders brought an action under
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933,96 alleging that the
90458 F.2d at 269-70.
91 Id. at 268-69.
92 Id. at 269.
93 Id. at 268.
94 See text accompanying notes 117- 18 infra.
95 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See text accompanying notes 148-53 infra.
96 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). Section I I holds civilly liable as a result ofa false registration
(1) all signers of registration statements; (2) directors; (3) accountants, engineers, or
professional persons having worked on registration statements: and (4) underwriters.
Section I I establishes, however, a defense of due diligence for all persons other than the
issuer who shall prove: (1) regarding information in the registration statement prepared by
nonexperts, that reasonable investigation was used to determine if the statements were
true; and (2) concerning representations made on authority of an expert, that it was
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registration statement contained material inaccuracies and omis-
sions. The court stated that the impression created by the registra-
tion statement was that the company was "in a continuous ascen-
dancy of business."-9 7 Parties defendant included the company, its
directors, certain corporate officers, the underwriter, and the com-
pany's auditors.
In terms of conflicts of interest, the salient point in BarChris
was that one of the directors of BarChris was also counsel to the
company in matters pertaining to its registration statement. Suit
was brought against him as a director and as a signer of the
registration statement.9 8 The court expressly stated that the action
was not for malpractice against the attorney in his capacity as a
lawyer.99 The court thought, however, that in considering the
attorney-director's defense of due diligence the unique position
which he occupied could not be disregarded. 100 Since he was the
director most concerned with preparing and assuring the accuracy
of the registration statement, more was required of him in terms of
reasonable investigation than could fairly be expected of another
director.101 Although the attorney-director had not made in-
tentional misrepresentations in the registration statement, his duty
to BarChris's shareholders was to make a reasonable investigation
into the information supplied him. By not making an appropriate
investigation he failed to exercise due diligence 0 2 as required by
the Securities Act.' 0
3
The conflicts in BarChris are unmistakable. The attorney owed
a duty to the management of the company which retained his law
firm. In addition, as a director of the company, he owed a duty to
the shareholders of BarChris to represent their interests. In the
BarChris case these loyalties clearly were not in harmony: one
duty obliged him to disclose fully, the other to serve the goals of
management. As a result of cases such as BarChris it has been
suggested that attorneys should not serve as directors of those
companies for which they act as counsel, but rules regulating such
conduct have never been adopted. 10 4
reasonable to believe that statements made in the registration statement were true and that
there were no material omissions. Id. § 77k(b)(3). Reasonable investigation is the standard
of reasonableness that is required of a prudent man in the management of his own
property. Id. § 77k(c).
97 283 F. Supp. at 683.







103 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(b), (c). See part IV infra.
104 See Hyatt, All in the Family: Dealings of Executives with their Own Firms Gets
Closer Scrutiny, Wall Street J., Aug. 8, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
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The SEC recently brought an action against National Student
Marketing Corporation, the corporation's law firm, and the corpo-
ration's accounting firm, alleging violations of the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws. 10 5 The suit arose out of a
number of activities, including the allegedly illegal issuance of
National Student Marketing stock, falsification of earnings and
other financial reports, and misrepresentation of the condition of
companies involved in the merger. On October 31, 1969, National
Student Marketing merged with Interstate National Corporation.
Allegedly, this merger was consummated without the accountant's
comfort letter's conforming with statements in the merger agree-
ment. The comfort letter outlined changes in the financial state-
ments of National Student Marketing which, if made, would have
reduced net earnings by a substantial amount. Moreover, it is
alleged that the adverse comfort letter was not disclosed to public
investors or the shareholders of National Student Marketing and
Interstate National, although the defendants knew shareholder
approval of the merger had been obtained on the basis of mate-
rially false and misleading financial statements. 10 6 The SEC addi-
tionally charged that the accountants amended their comfort letter
before the merger took place by stating that National Student
Marketing had a deficit for the period, and that defendants failed
to inform the other persons present at the closing of this amend-
ment. It is further alleged that the accountants proposed to coun-
sel that the comfort letter be corrected but that counsel did not
communicate this proposal to Interstate National. 0 7 Sub-
sequently, counsel issued an opinion which stated that all neces-
sary steps had been taken to consummate the merger and that
National Student Marketing had not violated any federal or state
statute or regulation.' 08
The essence of the SEC's case is its assertion that the attorneys
should not have issued their opinion but should have insisted that
the financial statements be revised and the shareholders resoli-
cited.' 0 9 In addition, the SEC departed from traditional concepts
of the attorney-client privilege by asserting that counsel should
have ceased their representation of their clients and notified the
SEC as to the misleading nature of the financial statements. 110
105 SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., Civ. No. 225-72 (D.D.C., Feb. 3, 1972).




110 It has been reported that the SEC and National Student Marketing have reached a
proposed settlement of the SEC action. The settlement does not include the other parties
defendant. National Student Marketing has agreed to a consent order, without admitting
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BarChris and National Student Marketing indicate that in the
area of securities regulation the central policy of full and accurate
disclosure to the investing public imposes a number of obligations
upon the attorney who offers an opinion. When those whom he
represents seek to disclose information different from that man-
dated by public policy, it is difficult for the attorney to avoid
conflicts of interest. Professor Hazard notes that the most com-
plex duty a lawyer has is that of a fiduciary to third-party in-
terests."' Considering the BarChris decision,11 2 he asserts that
"some kind of duty runs to the 'investing public'. What it is, and
how far you have to go in fulfilling it, is problematic."' 1 3 Professor
Hazard illustrates the problem with the case of Heyer v. Flaig,"4
where the court stated that the lawyer's duty is dictated by "pub-
lic policy [which] requires that the attorney exercise his position
of trust and superior knowledge responsibly so as not to affect
adversely persons whose rights and interests are certain and fore-
seeable."115
This duty can be applied to attorneys retained by investment
companies, who also have a fiduciary duty to represent the in-
terests of the shareholders of the fund. Thus, information dis-
closed to the shareholders must be full and accurate. Yet counsel
may concurrently represent affiliates of the fund, such as the
adviser, whose interests are often not congruent with those of the
fund.116 When the interests of the affiliate are clearly in opposition
to the fund, counsel's duty to the fund's management and the
fund's shareholders is strained to the degree of being incapable of
being met.
Another analogy in securities work that might be drawn to the
conflicts of interest problems of dual representation arises out of
any guilt on its part, and the corporation and its officers will be enjoined with respect to
certain future conduct. 159 SEC. REG. & L. REP. A-I (July 5, 1972).
111 In commenting on the National Student Marketing action, Professor Hazard has
stated that an attorney has four separate bases of obligation when he undertakes to
represent a client. These include:
The duty to client, assuming one can define who the client is; the duty to the
'court,' "in this case thinking of the SEC as a court-it is a tribunal that
performs quasi-adjudicative processes-it should be, and I think will be, in
my judgment, assimilated to a court for the purposes of the attorney's
responsibility to a tribunal." The lawyer also has a duty as an agent "under
ordinary, simple principles of agency-that is, he is acting in behalf of
someone .... Finally, and most complexly, he has a duty as a fiduciary to
third party interests . ..."
Expanding Responsibilities Under the Securities Acts, 156 SEC. REG. & L. REP. A-1, A-2
(June 14, 1972).
112 See note 95 supra.
113 156 SEC. REG. & L. REP. at A-3 (June 14, 1972).
114 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).
115 Id.at 229, 449 P.2d at 165, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
11
6 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
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the situation where counsel for the issuer or underwriter, advising
the issuer or underwriter on matters pertaining to the registration
statement, is also an owner of securities of the registrant. In order
to mitigate the resulting conflicts of interest in such a situation,
the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance amended the SEC
guidelines for the preparation of registration statements to require
that counsel who pass upon the legality of the registration or
offering disclose in the prospectus the nature and amount of any
interest, presently owned or to be received, in the registrant.
117
Compliance with this directive will enable potential investors to
weigh the independence and objectivity of counsel's opinions. It
has furthermore been suggested that the remedy of Securities Act
Release No. 5094 is insufficient, and that advising attorneys
should not be allowed to have any financial interest in the regis-
trant.118
An attorney who holds stock in a registrant has loyalties which
are obviously divided. The allegiances of an attorney who is re-
tained by both the investment company and its affiliates are sim-
ilarly strained, in spite- of the fact that his own interests may not
be as directly involved. These conflicts are analogous, for in both
cases interests which stand in opposition to each other are being
represented by one and the same advocate. In a context where
conflict of interest situations are easily kindled and duties and
obligations are difficult to define, it would seem anomalous to
permit counsel to represent both investment companies and their
affiliates.
IV. DUTY OF THE DIRECTORS OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES
TO RETAIN INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
Several practical factors bear on directors in deciding whether
to retain independent counsel. The director himself may not be
aware of conflicts of interest, for the attorney will be hesitant to
reveal such conflicts if the result is the termination of his services.
Retaining additional counsel also increases the costs associated
with conducting negotiations and litigation. Where conflicts are
not sharply defined these additional costs may seem unjustified.
Finally, it may be difficult to implement an operating procedure
which can determine when separate counsel is required.
With respect to investment companies, at least four possible
117 Securities Act Release No. 5094 (October 21, 1970).
118 See SEC Commissioner James Needham's address before the Federal Bar Associ-
ation, Dec. 2, 1969.
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means could be utilized to select independent counsel. First, it
could be required by statute that the fund's disinterested
unaffiliated directors retain independent counsel who have no
previous connection with the fund's affiliates. Second, it could be
required that all insiders such as the adviser, interested affiliated
directors, or officers retain separate counsel. Third, present coun-
sel could be required to select new counsel. Finally, the court
could select new counsel.
Of these four methods of selection, only the first presents a
viable solution to the problem. If the second alternative were
chosen there is a good possibility that counsel representing the
fund would have a residual bias in favor of their former employ-
ers. 119 If the third method were utilized, counsel might select
someone whom he felt would not oppose him too vigorously. If
the last method were chosen, selection of counsel would be time-
consuming. Furthermore, in cases where the court is not familiar
with the parties, the selection of proper counsel could be a
difficult task. This last method might be used only where a deriva-
tive action is brought against the disinterested directors and the
officers of the fund. 20 In that event the court could request that
the directors submit a list of attorneys from which counsel might
be chosen.
The only realistic solution to the problem is that the dis-
interested unaffiliated directors be required to retain independent
counsel to represent the fund. 2 ' In the case of newly established
funds, independent counsel should be retained when the relation-
ships between the fund and its affiliates first come into existence.
This would effectively prevent the development of divided loyal-
ties. In the case of already established funds, independent counsel
should be required immediately, before conflicts of interest can
develop any further.
While disinterested unaffiliated directors have the authority to
select and supervise independent counsel, 22 this article contends
that these directors have not only a right but a fiduciary duty to
119 This potential bias would stem from the fact that counsel's first loyalty might remain
with the directors and officers who are affiliated with the adviser or underwriter, who have
been his principal contact with the "inanimate" corporate client in the past. In addition,
counsel might fear that rendering advice antagonistic to the affiliated directors' and officers'
interests would impair future relations with his corporate client. See Note, supra note 70,
at 533.
120 See id. at 535.
121 In cases where the disinterested unaffiliated directors hire counsel to represent the
fund, counsel should be paid by the fund and not the adviser. See text accompanying notes
36-40 supra.
122 See parts I B and C supra.
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the fund under Subsection 36(a) of the Investment Company Act
to demand the retention of independent counsel.
123
A. Statutory Authority for the Retention
of Independent Counsel
The express policy of the Act provides a useful starting point
for a discussion of the statutory authority for requiring the
disinterested unaffiliated directors of investment companies to
retain separate counsel. Subsection (b)(2) of Section 1 states that
the national interest is adversely affected when investment com-
panies are operated for individual interests rather than those of
the entity as a whole. 124 Arguably, those conflicts of interest
which arise out of the retention of the same counsel by investment
companies and their affiliates adversely affect the national public
interest and the interests of shareholders, for this dual representa-
tion evidences that these investment companies are being oper-
ated for the benefit of their affiliates and not the interests of their
shareholders.
Additionally, the language of Subsection 36(a) of the Act pro-
vides authority for requiring mutual funds to retain separate coun-
123 Pursuant to the common law of corporations, directors owe a fiduciary duty to the
corporation and its minority shareholders to act in the best interests of the corporation.
They cannot use their position of trust to benefit themselves or a particular group of
shareholders at the expense of the corporation or its other shareholders.
He who is in such a fiduciary position cannot serve himself first and his
cestuis second .... He cannot use his power for his personal advantage and
to the detriment of the stockholders and creditors no matter how absolute in
terms that power may be and no matter how meticulous he is to satisfy
technical requirements.
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 31 (1939). In addition, a director
owes loyalty and allegiance to the company-a loyalty that is undivided and
an allegiance that is influenced in action by no consideration other than the
welfare of the corporation. Any adverse interest of a director will be sub-
jected to a scrutiny rigid and uncompromising ....
Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 677 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
See generally Comment, Private Rights of Action Against Mutual Fund Investment
Advisers:Amended Section 36 of the 1940 Act, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 143 (197 1); Freedman
& Rosenblatt, Duties to Mutual Funds, 4 REV. SEC. REG. 937 (1971); Vanderwicken,
Change Invades the Boardroom, FORTUNE, May, 1972, at 156.
124 Section I (b) provides in part:
[l]t is declared that the national public interest and the interests of investors
are adversely affected -
(2) when investment companies are organized, operated, managed, or
portfolio securities are selected, in the interest of directors, officers, in-
vestment advisers, depositors, or other affiliated persons thereof, in the
interests of underwriters, brokers, or-dealers, in the interest of special classes
of their security holders, or in the interest of other investment companies or
persons engaged in other lines of business, rather than in the interest of all
classes of such companies' security holders ....
15 U.S.C. §80a-l(b) (1970).
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sel. That subsection authorizes the SEC to bring an action alleg-
ing that an officer, director, or adviser of a registered investment
company has engaged in or is about to engage in any act or
practice constituting a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal
misconduct with respect to the company.12 When the fund be-
comes involved in a controversy with any of its affiliates, the
disinterested unaffiliated directors of the investment company
may have a fiduciary duty to the fund shareholders to secure
independent counsel to represent the fund; if so, the failure to do
so would be punishable under Subsection 36(a).
Various sections of the Act prohibit investment company man-
agement from engaging in certain types of conduct. The com-
plexity of the investment company industry and the unique rela-
tionships upon which it rests, however, present possibilities for
abuses which were not readily anticipated when the statute was
first enacted. It was therefore necessary to insert a residuary
clause into the Act which would encompass unspecified conduct
involving a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the fund's
affiliates. This catchall clause was Section 36.126 It had been
suggested that the fund's independent directors should be held to
a higher standard of fiduciary duty under Section 36 than the
affiliated directors of the adviser. 127 Subsection 36(a), as pre-
viously noted, 128 was amended by Congress in 1970. Prior to that
time, the SEC had been empowered to take action only in situ-
ations where the investment company management had engaged
in conduct amounting to a "gross abuse of trust." Currently any
breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct will permit
the SEC to bring an action. The fiduciary standard required has
been made more encompassing. 129 A strong argument can be
'2 Id.§ 80a-35(a). See also text accompanying note 41 supra.
126 Note, supra note 7, at 937.
1
27 See id. at 939. See also Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), affd,
294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961); Comment, supra note 5, at 707.
128 See text accompanying note 41 supra.
129 Id. According to the House Report on the bill to amend Section 36,
The amended section will enable the Commission to move against officers,
directors, and advisory board members of an investment company and its
investment advisers or principal underwriters if they engage or are about to
engage in conduct which violates prevailing standards of fiduciary duty
involving personal misconduct.
.. [Section 36 was] not intended to provide a basis for the Commission
to undertake a general revision of the practices or structures of the in-
vestment company industry. On the other hand, [it was not intended] to limit
the Commission under this section to situations where an actual intent to
violate the law can be shown or to acts of affirmative misconduct. In appro-
priate cases, nonfeasance of duty or abdiction [sic] of responsibility would
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct
H.R. REP. No. 9 1-1382, 9 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1970) (emphasis added).
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made that the failure on the part of the directors of an investment
company to retain separate counsel when conflicts of interest
arise between the investment company and its affiliates should be
deemed nonfeasance of duty or abdication of responsibility on the
part of these directors (especially the disinterested unaffiliated
directors) and therefore a violation of Subsection 36(a) of the Act.
B. Recent Decisions-Duty of Directors and
Affiliated Persons
Several noteworthy cases decided recently emphasize the
fiduciary responsibilities of affiliates of investment companies and
indicate increasing public awareness of the issues surrounding
fiduciary obligations.130 Moses v. Burgin 131 was a derivative ac-
tion by shareholders of Fidelity Fund. The plantiffs alleged viola-
tions of the Act arising out of Fidelity's use of "reciprocals" (the
practice of placing commission business with broker-dealers who
sold Fidelity shares or provided research) and "give-ups" (the
practice of directing other brokers to "give up" a portion of their
commissions on Fidelity business to broker-dealers who sold Fi-
delity shares or provided research). The shareholders charged that
these practices benefited the adviser and not the fund. The share-
holders further alleged that Fidelity should have "recaptured '" 13 2 a
portion of the brokerage commissions or used alternative methods
which would increase benefits to the Fidelity shareholders by a
reduction in the advisory fee. 133 The attack on this use of recipro-
cals was unsuccessful. The court of appeals did note, however,
that for the management of an investment company "[s]elf-dealing
is not the exception but.., the order of the day." 13 4 The court
stated that in response to this self-dealing Congress had enacted a
mandatory provision for independent "watch-dog" directors. The
130 See Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 274 F. Supp. 624 (D.D.C. 1967) in
which the court stated that the board of directors of mutual funds "have essentially the
equivalent powers as any corporate board of directors..." and as such are "also respon-
sible to their shareholders as fiduciaries." 274 F. Supp. at 630. See also Pepper v. Litton,
308 U.S. 295, (1939); Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), af'd, 294
F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1961).
131 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. ), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (197 1), rev'g 316 F. Supp. 31 (D.
Mass. 1970).
132 Recapture arrangements usually provide for the institution to set up a broker-dealer
affiliate as a member of a regional exchange for the purpose of effecting brokerage
transactions and then applying the commissions on these transactions against the fund's
advisory fee.
133 See Miller & Carlson, Recapture of Brokerage Commissions by Mutual Funds, 46
N.Y.U.L. REV. 35 (1971).
134 445 F.2d at 376.
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court thought that management had a legal duty to these in-
dependent directors to inform them of the possibilities of recap-
ture. In concealing the information management had violated that
duty.135 The court defined the standard of disclosure owed to
these independent directors:
Whatever may be the duty of disclosure owed to ordinary
corporate directors, we think the conclusion unavoidable that
Management defendants were under a duty of full disclosure
of information to these unaffiliated directors in every area
where there was a possible conflict of interest between their
interests and the interests of the fund.
3 6
The court found that the management defendants knew that the
possibility of recapture was a serious and unresolved issue in-
volving a potential conflict between the interests of management
and of the shareholders. Their failure to bring this possibility to
the attention of the independent directors constituted gross mis-
conduct and was therefore a violation of the former Section 36 of
the Act.'
3 7
This decision reinforces the concept of the disinterested direc-
tor as one whose function is to represent objectively the interests
of fund shareholders.138 The affiliated directors had a duty of
disclosure to the disinterested directors. It was therefore a breach
of fiduciary duty not to disclose the possibility of recapture. The
court stated that disinterested directors have a duty to act on the
information disclosed and any nonfeasance on their part is also a
breach of fiduciary duty.
The duty to disclose is not the only case illustrative of possible
conflict of interest situations.139 In April, 1972, the breakpoint on
negotiated rates for commissions on the trading of securities was
lowered to $300,000. As a result, investment companies who
have management companies with an affiliate on a regional ex-
change are permitted to negotiate comissions on all transactions
135 Once disclosure was made it would then be for the board of directors to determine
according to their best business judgment if recapture were feasible. The business judg-
ment rule is a defense for directors who, in the exercise of their discretionary powers,
cause corporate losses through errors in judgment. It is founded on the belief that
directors, elected by the shareholders for this purpose, are in the best position to decide
corporate policy and that a court, less familiar with the problems involved, should not
substitute its judgment for that of the directors. The shareholders have no right to appeal
to the courts for relief from the decisions made by the directors if these decisions are made
in good faith, with due care, and in accordance with applicable fiduciary duties owed the
corporation and its shareholders.
136 445 F.2d at 376 (emphasis added).
137 Id.at 384,
138 See Acampora v. Birkland, 220 F. Supp. 527, 550 (D. Colo. 1963).
139 See Comment, supra note 2, at 43 1-33.
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over that figure. Subsection 17(e) of the Act states that these
affiliates are permitted to charge a reasonable and customary
commission rate.1 40 In light of this authority the question emerges
as to how affiliates can negotiate a commission rate with them-
selves. It should be evident that with so many conflicts of interest
the retention of the same attorney by the fund and its affiliates
exacerbates an already difficult situation.
In Rosenfeld v. Black'4' the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit stated that an investment adviser is a fiduciary and thus
comes within the scope of the principle that a fiduciary may not
sell or transfer his office for personal gain. The case involved the
sale by Lazard Freres, the Lazard Fund's adviser, of the advisory
agreement at a substantial profit. The court stated that when
Congress required that the shareholders approve any new adviso-
ry agreement in Subsection 15(a) of the Act, it must have meant
an approval uninfluenced by any improper motivations on the part
of the outgoing adviser. The court also believed that the very fact
of nonassignability of an investment contract 42 demonstrated that
any payment made to the adviser by his successor in these cir-
cumstances in excess of the value of any continuing services
represents unlawful. consideration for the use of influence in se-
curing shareholder approval of the successor. In his analysis of
the transaction, Judge Friendly started from the basic com-
mon-law principle that because of inherent conflicts of interest, a
trustee may not traffic in his trust. He then reasoned, "ITlhe only
certain way to insure full compliance with that duty is to eliminate
any possibility of personal gain."' The court thought that it was
implicit that these basic common-law principles of equity were
specifically incorporated into the Act.44
140 15 U.S.C. § 80a- 17(e)(2) (1970) states:
It shall be unlawful for any affiliated person of a registered investment
company, or any affiliated person of such person-
(2) acting as broker, in connection with the sale of securities to or by such
registered company or any controlled company thereof, to receive from any
source a commission, fee, or other remuneration for effecting such transac-
tion which exceeds (A) the usual and customary broker's commission if the
sale is effected on a securities exchange ....
141 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971). See generally Recent Decisions, 40 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 312 (197 1); Note, Mutual Fund Control-Transfer Profits: Congress, the SEC, and
Rosenfeld v. Black, 58 VA. L. REV. 371 (1972); Note, Fiduciary Requirements and the
Succession Fee upon the Change of Mutual FundAdvisers, 85 HARV. L. REv. 655 (1972).
142 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(4) (1970) provides that an investment advisory contract will
automatically terminate in the event of its assignment, stating that an assignment:
i]ncludes any direct or indirect transfer or hypothecation of a contract or
chose in action by the assignor, or of a controlling block of the assignor's
outstanding voting securities by a security holder of the assignor ....
143 445 F.2d at 1342.
1
44 Id. at 1345.
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The Rosenfeld case underscores and emphasizes to investment
advisers that they stand in a fiduciary position with respect to the
investment companies they advise. Furthermore, while the new
amendments to Section 36 of the Act expressly make the in-
vestment adviser a fiduciary with respect to the receipt of com-
pensation from the investment company, 145 Judge Friendly
thought that it was plain that Congress did not intend this section
to be the exclusive fiduciary duty of investment advisers.
1'4
The failure on the part of the investment adviser in Rosenfeld
to live up to the fiduciary standard owed to the fund shareholders
is analogous to a situation where the independent directors of the
fund fail to obtain independent counsel and instead permit the
same counsel to represent both the fund and the adviser in any
litigation. The analogy is based on the reasoning that this failure is
a breach of fiduciary obligation. At the very least, just as the
adviser should have disclosed to the Lazard Fund shareholders
any profits that were made on the sale of the advisory agreement,
the directors of a fund should be required to disclose that the
same counsel is attempting to represent the interests of both the
fund and the adviser in litigation. In the final analysis disclosure
alone may not be sufficient to satisfy the directors' fiduciary
responsibilities to the fund; the hiring of independent counsel
should be required where the interests of the investment company
and its affiliates are clearly adverse. 14
7
Escott v. BarChris Construction Co.148 is pertinent here, al-
though that case was concerned with the directors and affiliates of
an operating company. The court noted that a director is pre-
sumed to know his responsibility to the shareholders of the corpo-
ration when he becomes a director. 149 The court further stated
that "[a director should] not act in an important matter without
145 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1970) states:
[Tlhe investment adviser of a registered investment company shall be
deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation
for services, or of payments of a material nature, paid by such registered
investment company, or by the security holders thereof, to such investment
adviser or any affiliated person of such investment adviser ....
146 445 F.2d at 1348. The Rosenfeld decision was directly responsible for the recent
legislative proposal of the SEC to Congress that is designed to permit investment advisory
companies to sell their businesses at a profit under certain circumstances. Commissioner
Sydney Herlong, Jr., stated that the confusion created by the Rosenfeld decision with
respect to whether a premium can be paid for a management company is. "undesirable."
Under the proposed legislation, a proposed new adviser would not be assured, however, of
having its management contract approved by the fund. N.Y. Times, May 19, 1972, at 49,
col. 4.
14 7 See text accompanying notes 128-29supra.
148 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), discussed in text accompanying notes 95-104
supra.
149 283 F. Supp. at 688.
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any knowledge of the relevant facts, in sole reliance upon the
representations of [others] ".... 150 The court applied this stan-
dard to both the internal directors and those not associated with
the internal management of the corporation.
Although the responsibilities discussed above are in the context
of those owed when investigating registration statements, the
same reasoning can be applied to directors of investment com-
panies in all of their duties. In investment companies, the dis-
interested unaffiliated directors serve an important function as a
buffer between the fund shareholders on one side and the affiliated
directors and adviser on the other. 151 Disinterested directors
should not uncritically approve matters which call for their ap-
proval simply because the position is supported by the affiliated
directors or adviser. Arguably the disinterested unaffiliated direc-
tors have a fiduciary obligation to exercise their best business
judgment 152 and to recommend that the fund retain independent
counsel when the fund's interests are in conflict with those of its
affiliates. In light of BarChris it can be argued that the dis-
interested unaffiliated directors should be held to a higher stan-
dard of fiduciary duty under Section 36 of the Act than the
affiliated directors or the adviser. In BarChris the public might
have looked to the professionals to assure accurate preparation of
the registration statement. With the investment company and its
complement of interested managers, the public's interest is more
properly identified with the unaffiliated directors. If this were
sufficient to raise the duty of reasonable investigation in BarChris
it should also be sufficient to raise the duty of the nonaffiliate
under Section 36.153 Retention of separate counsel by the dis-
interested unaffiliated directors would significantly implement the
effectuation of these duties.
C. A Useful Comparison: Chapter X
of the Bankruptcy Act
The suggestion that the directors of an investment company
have a fiduciary responsibility to retain independent counsel to
represent the interests of the fund should not be considered a
startling revelation. What is startling is that the hue and cry has
150 Id. Judge McLean noted that "[the positions of the underwriter and the company's
officers are adverse .... " and it is the underwriter's duty to delve deeply and in-
dependently into the company's fiscal position. Id. at 696- 97.
i51 See text accompanying note 26 supra.
152 See note 135 supra.
153 See Note, supra note 3, at 939.
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not been sounded sooner. For years attorneys appointed to repre-
sent a Chapter X trustee have been required to be disinterested
persons.154 A trustee under Chapter X has the primary respon-
sibility for the effectuation of a plan of reorganization. Success of
the reorganization largely depends upon the fashion in which he
performs his duty. Success is also largely a function of the
trustee's attorney.
155
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act requires that the trustee's
attorney be as disinterested as the trustee himself. The logic is
simple: it would be anomalous to require that the trustee be
disinterested and at the same time permit him to be guided and
directed in his duties by an attorney who is not disinterested.'
56
This necessarily follows because the trustee's lawyer is "a con-
trolling and conditioning force in the entire reorganization sys-
tem."' 157 The same reasoning applies to the investment company
industry. It would be senseless for a mutual fund and its dis-
interested unaffiliated directors to be represented by an attorney
who is not completely disinterested in the fund's adviser or under-
writer. Only if the attorney is chosen by the disinterested direc-
tors and paid by the fund, not by the adviser, can the public
shareholders' interests best be represented.
5158
In the case of In re G. W. Giannini, Inc.,' 59 the court ex-
pounded upon the rule calling for independent counsel in bank-
ruptcy proceedings. It held that disinterested counsel must be
required in order to prevent not only actual evils in specific cases
but "the tendency to evil in all cases."' 160 It has been stated that
154 I1 U.S.C. § 557 (1970). I1 U.S.C. § 558 (1970) provides in part:
A person shall not be deemed disinterested, for the purposes of [the Act],
if
(3) he is, or was within two years prior to the date of the filing of the
petition,. . . an attorney for the debtor or such underwriter .... (emphasis
added).
155 Ferber et al., Conflicts of Interest in Reorganization Proceedings Under the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 28 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 319, 339 (1959).
15 6 See In re McGrath Mfg. Co., 95 F. Supp. 825, 834 (D. Neb. 1951); see also 6
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 7.06 at 1175 (14th ed. 197 1).
157 Douglas, Improvement in Federal Procedure for Corporate Reorganizations, 24
A.B.A.J. 875, 879 (1938).
158 When counsel represents both the fund and its affiliates, problems are likely to arise.
In the course of the proceedings counsel will necessarily appear as an adversary to many
participants. Even if counsel has taken his posi tion with the strictest impartiality, dis-
appointed litigants may suspect the worst and may be inclined to attribute his actions,
however baselessly, to his concern for other clients. The resulting atmosphere is almost
impossible to cope with, and can even affect the reputation of counsel as well as the
client's faith in the proceeding.
159 90 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1937).
160 Id. at 448.
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this rule will have no exceptions, even where it can be shown that
counsel acted in good faith. 161
V. MEANS OF REFORM: SEC RULEMAKING
The problem of the retention of independent legal counsel can
be seen from two points of view. One view embodies the notion
that there is an ethical obligation for attorneys to refrain from
representing clients in situations where conflicts of interest may or
could possibly exist. The American Bar Association has formu-
lated general rules of conduct which attempt to deal with conflicts
resulting from dual representation. 162 The ABA explicitly stated
in its former Canons of Professional Ethics that no code or set of
rules can be promulgated which will specify all the duties of the
lawyer. 16 3 The Canons also stated that they are intended as a
general guide and not meant to deny the existence of other more
specific rules. 16 4 It is reasonable to assume that these concepts
apply to the new Code as well. 165 The cases discussed in this
article demonstrate that although the ABA attempts to regulate
the conduct of lawyers, its efforts have not always met with
success. 16 6 Enforcement of these guidelines with respect to the
investment company industry has been negligible. The resolution
of the problem of conflicts of interest resulting from dual retention
of lawyers by investment companies and their affiliates can be
found in the fiduciary obligation of directors and officers of in-
vestment companies to prevent conflicts of interest. In con-
junction with this, it is the responsibility of the SEC to create an
atmosphere that is conducive to the recognition of these fiduciary
obligations. Although Congress itself might consider resolving this
conflict of interest problem by statutory amendment, the exercise
by the SEC of its rulemaking power would appear to be the most
effective means available.
161 See In re Progress Lektro Shave Corp., 117 F.2d 602, 604 (2d Cir. 1941) where an
attorney was denied compensation for his services because he was not disinterested. The
SEC has stated that it
customarily examines the qualifications of trustees in the light of the stan-
dards of disinterestedness prescribed by the statute for trustees and their
counsel. Where it appears that the trustee or his counsel is not disinterested,
the Commission calls the facts to the attention of the court and takes other
appropriate steps looking toward the resignation or removal of these
fidicuaries.
SEC, 18TH ANN. REP. 144 (1952).
162 See text accompanying note 44 supra.
163 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, PREAMBLE.
164 Id.
165 See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
1
6 See text accompanying notes 95- 115 supra.
[VOL. 6:58
Conflicts of Interest
One realistic and feasible solution would consist of a two-stage
approach. The SEC might first issue an informative release which
would delineate the problem and indicate to directors and officers
of investment companies, especially the disinterested unaffiliated
directors, that under Subsection 36(a) of the Act and applicable
case law, they have a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of their
respective funds to prevent conflicts of interest resulting from the
retention of the same attorneys by both investment companies
and their affiliates. This release would instruct directors and
Officers that in order to avoid these conflicts investment com-
panies should retain separate counsel. Although the release would
not promulgate direct punitive sanctions for failure to comply with
its suggestions, it nevertheless would clarify this aspect of the
obligations owed by directors and officers of investment com-
panies to fund shareholders.
The SEC might thereafter allow an adequate period for the
investment company industry to comply with the SEC's sugges-
tions.1 6 7 During this time the SEC could determine the extent to
which there has been compliance with the release. If a significant
number of funds comply, the Commission might then require that
any noncomplying fund disclose to its shareholders that both the
fund and its affiliates employ the same counsel, that possible
conflicts of interest may thereby result, and that the Commission
has requested that this practice cease. The SEC could implement
these disclosure requirements by amending its guidelines for the
preparation of registration statements. 16 8 These proposed dis-
closure requirements would subject the directors and officers of
noncomplying funds to action brought either by the SEC or by
shareholders pursuant to Subsection 36(a) of the Act.
69
If after the original period, however, the Commission deter-
mines that a substantial number of funds have failed to retain
separate counsel, it could then promulgate a rule affirmatively re-
quiring that mutual funds retain separate counsel. Because of the
additional administrative burden entailed, this approach would be
more difficult to implement than a noncompulsory directive. Yet
167 This should allow sufficient time for funds to secure new counsel and allow their
present attorneys to complete or transfer pending matters.
168 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 7220 (June 9, 1972) sets forth guidelines
for use in the preparation and filing of registration statements pursuant to Section 6 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1970), for both open-end and closed-end manage-
ment investment companies. Before a fund can sell its securities to the public it must have
an effective registration statement. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7(a) (1970).
169 Id. § 80a-35(a). See Freedman & Rosenblatt, Duties to Mutual Funds, 4 REV. SEC.
REG. 937 (1971); Comment, supra note 5, at 700.
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in all likelihood, the mandatory approach would prove more
effective.
Subsections 36(a) 170 and 38(a)171 of the Act grant the SEC the
authority by which it could promulgate a rule governing the em-
ployment of separate counsel. The rule might state that for pur-
poses of Subsection 36(a) a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of
a fund's officers and directors may result from the retention by the
fund and its affiliates of the same counsel. The SEC should
adopt the position that not all cases in which the fund and its
affiliates retain the same attorney result in conflicts of interest
leading to a breach of fiduciary duty. A proposed rule should
simply state that retention of the same counsel in these circum-
stances may bring about conflicts of interest which would be
violative of Subsection 36(a).
The authority of the SEC to promulgate rules such as the one
proposed here is broad in scope.172 The rules of the Commission
may be generally classified as either exemptive or nonexemptive
in character. Exemptive rules permit those who fall within the
Commission's statutory jurisdiction to engage in conduct which
would normally be proscribed by the Act. To allow the Commis-
sion to exempt conditionally or unconditionally any person, secu-
rity, or transaction from any of the provisions of the Act, Sub-
section 6(c) 173 grants the SEC extensive power to promulgate
exemptive rules.' 74 The only limitation on these exemptive pow-
ers is that a rule exempting a specific course of conduct or
transaction must be "necessary or appropriate in the public in-
terest and consistent with the protection of investors and the
purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions" of the
Act. 175 Nonexemptive rules, on the other hand, aid in effectuating
the legislative intent of particular sections of the Act. Subsection
38(a) gives the Commission authority to promulgate nonexemp-
tive rules in cases where a particular section of the Act does not
specifically confer this authority.
176
170 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (1970). See text accompanying note 124 supra.
171 15 U.S.C. § 80a-37(a) (1970).
172 See Motley et al., supra note 17, at 451; Jaretzki, supra note 17, at 344.
173 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (1970).
174 Jaretzki, supra note 17, at 344.
175 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (1970).
On numerous occasions the SEC has used this broad grant of authority to promulgate
rules exempting conduct which would otherwise be prohibited by other sections of the
Act. It is worth noting that the language of some sections specifically confers rulemaking
power on the Commission while other sections are silent in this regard. Subsection 6(c) has
been used by the SEC to promulgate rules under various sections of the Act regardless of
whether specific rulemaking authority has been conferred by other sections.
176 Section 38(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-37(a) (1970), provides in part:
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The legislative history of the Act reveals that the rulemaking
authority vested in the Commission by Subsection 38(a) was
intended to conform with the general rulemaking powers of sim-
ilar provisions in the other federal securities laws.177 Although the
specific wording of the subsection grants the SEC authority to
make rules "as are necessary or appropriate to the exercise of the
powers conferred upon the Commission elsewhere in this title,"
the legislative history of the 1970 amendments indicates that the
statutory wording should be interpreted as being synonymous
with the wording of Subsection 20(a) of the Public Utilities Hold-
ing Company Act of 1935 (PUHC Act).178 The wording of Sub-
section 20(a) of the PUHC Act states that the Commission has
rulemaking authority "as it may deem necessary or appropriate to
carry out the provisions of this title." The interpretation given to
this language is crucial in determining whether the Commission
can promulgate rules under Subsection 36(a) of the Act, for the
wording of Subsection 36(a), although authorizing actions based
on breaches of fiduciary duty, does not confer specific rulemaking
authority on the Commission. 79 If Subsection 38(a) is interpreted
The Commission shall have authority ... to make, issue, amend, and
rescind such rules and regulations and such orders as are necessary or
appropriate to the exercise of the powers conferred upon the Commission
elsewhere in this subchapter, including rules and regulations defining ac-
counting, technical, and trade terms used in this subchapter .... For the
purposes of its rules or regulations the Commission may classify persons,
securities, and other matters within its jurisdiction and prescribe different
requirements for different classes of persons, securities, or matters.
177 See Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. I, at 310, 312-317 (1940). The other sections are
§ 19(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1970), § 23(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, id. § 78w(a), and § 20(a) of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act, id. § 79t.178 15 U.S.C. § 79t (1970). See Hearings on H.R. 9510, 9511 Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 15, 86 (1967) in which the Commission and the Investment
Company Institute
agree that existing provisions of the ... Act give the Commission
rule-making authority which is comparable to that provided under other
federal securities laws and that the difference in language among the various
rule-making provisions are not intended to indicate substantive differences in
the extent of such authority. Accordingly, if the Congress agrees with this
conclusion, Section 21 of S. 1659 would serve no useful purpose and should
be deleted from S. 1659.
Id. at 86. Congress agreed with this conclusion by dropping the proposed amendment of
§ 38(a). The amendment would have read, in pertinent part:
The Commission shall have authority from time to time to make, issue,
amend, and rescind such rules and regulations and such orders as it may
deem necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title ....
Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
179 It should be emphasized that the Commission has, in the past, promulgated rules
pursuant to the authority vested under § 38(a) where the specific wording of a section did
not confer rulemaking authority.
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to be equivalent to Subsection 20(a) of the PUHC Act, then all
that need be demonstrated in order to promulgate a rule under
Subsection 36(a) is that the rule is necessary or appropriate to
carry out the provisions of the Act. That is to say, it is not
necessary to demonstrate that a specific power is conferred upon
the SEC by the statutory wording of Subsection 36(a). Arguably,
just as Subsection 6(c) has been used by the Commission to
promulgate exemptive rules under sections which contain no
specific language granting rulemaking authority, Subsection 38(a)
can be used by the Commission as the authority for issuing a
nonexemptive rule under Subsection 36(a).
Once it has been established that the SEC has rulemaking
authority under Subsection 36(a), the critical question becomes
whether the specific rule to be adopted comes within the statutory
requirement that it be "necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions" of the Act. Both the disjunctive phraseology and the
legislative history of Subsection 38(a) indicate that a rule does not
have to be "necessary" to carry out the provisions of the Act but
is supported by statutory authority if it is merely "appropriate" to
carry out such provisions.'1 0 Subsection 36(a) gives the SEC
express power to institute legal actions for breach of fiduciary
duty. Subsection 38(a) gives the SEC power to make rules neces-
sary or appropriate to the exercise of that express grant of power.
The rule proposed here would define a breach of fiduciary duty on
the part of a fund's directors and officers to include those situ-
ations where the fund and its affiliates retain the same attorney.
The power to define breach of fiduciary duty for purposes of
Subsection 36(a) would be an "appropriate" means of enabling
the Commission to determine whether to bring suit.
This proposed rule would not deprive the courts of an issue
upon which to rule. A court would still determine whether the
facts involved in a particular case in which both the fund and its
affiliates retain the same attorney resulted in a conflict of interest.
Having so determined, a court would then be free to decide
whether the officers and directors breached their fiduciary duty to
fund shareholders by permitting this situation to exist. If a breach
were found, liability would follow under Subsection 36(a). Rather
than abrogating the authority of the courts, this proposed rule
would serve to bring situations which may be violative of Subsec-
o80 The word "appropriate," which did not appear in the Securities Act of 1933 or the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was contained in § 20(a) of the PUHC Act and was also
incorporated into the wording of the initial bill on investment company legislation. A study
of the legislative history indicates that a rule which is only "appropriate" and not "neces-
sary" is nevertheless authorized if otherwise satisfactory.
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tion 36(a) to the attention of the court so that an outcome with full
judicial authority will ensue. The Commission would initiate the
legal proceedings while the courts would determine whether an
actual breach of duty has occurred. 118
Subsection 38(a) provides a further source of statutory author-
ity for the proposed rule. That subsection provides that the Com-
mission shall have rulemaking authority as long as the rules it
promulgates "are necessary or appropriate to the exercise of the
powers conferred upon the Commission elsewhere in this sub-
chapter, including rules and regulations defining accounting, tech-
nical, and trade terms used in this subchapter .... "182 The use of
the word "including" can have two possible meanings in this
context. On one hand, it can be narrowly construed so that the
scope of the Commission's rulemaking authority under the section
is limited to defining accounting, technical, and trade terms used
in the Act. If this is the accepted interpretation, the SEC has
authority to promulgate the rule proposed here because the term
"breach of fiduciary duty" as used in Subsection 36(a) is a techni-
cal term subject to definition under Subsection 38(a). On the other
hand, if the word "including" is construed broadly, it can be
argued that the statutory wording is intended merely to set forth
examples of areas subject to SEC rulemaking authority. The
Commission has the authority to promulgate rules in other areas
so long as these rules are "necessary or appropriate" to the
exercise of the powers conferred upon the Commission in other
sections of the Act. If this latter interpretation is accepted then
the Commission would simply have to demonstrate that a rule is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Act. In
light of either interpretation, there would appear to be no ob-
stacles remaining which prevent the SEC from promulgating the
rule proposed in this article.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has considered the legal implications of the same
attorney's representing both an investment company and its
affiliates. 183 The practice is currently widespread, and, as has been
181 See note 41 supra. The Commission apparently feels that it can determine in its own
right whether a breach of fiduciary duty has occurred.
182 15 U.S.C. § 80a-37(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
183 Although the scope of this article has been limited to attorneys' conflicts of interest in
the investment company context, similar problems arise when a fund and one or more of
its affiliates employ the same accountants. See generally Kripke, The SEC, the Accoun-
tants: Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1151 (1970): Higgins, Profes-
sional Ethics: A Time for Reappraisal, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Mar., 1962, at 29.
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shown, is in many cases detrimental to the interests of the mutual
fund and its shareholders. This article has argued that under
traditional notions of corporation law the directors of an in-
vestment company may have a fiduciary duty to retain counsel
independent of the counsel retained by the adviser of the fund;
additionally, an attorney may have a corresponding ethical duty
not to represent both the adviser and the fund. However, because
practical forces bear on both the investment company and the
attorney not to insist that the fund retain independent counsel,
government regulation of the relationships between the fund, its
affiliate, and counsel is appropriate. To this end, this article has
suggested an approach that the SEC might adopt to protect the
currently unprotected interests of mutual fund shareholders. Al-
though other means of achieving this goal are possible, the current
structure of the investment company industry dictates that the
most efficient means of affording needed protection to share-
holders is affirmative action by the SEC of the type proposed in
this article.
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